NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
These articles make the argument that Australia needs a national security strategy (NSS) in order to prepare and defend against potential threats Australia faces in a changing strategic situation, including diminished US power.
In these articles I outline potential threats which include military threats but also political, economic and/or social threats too. I also call for greater parliamentary oversight of defence with the establishment of a new parliamentary defence committee.
Recent Publications on National Security Strategy (NSS)
Op-Ed: We’re back! Australia prepares for a post-COVID world by focusing on sovereignty, prosperity and resilience
NATIONAL SECURITY – THE SOLUTION
In this article I explain that I want Australia, for the first time in its history to be PREPARED for its uncertain future. By being prepared, perhaps we will not have to endure the worst. This is not about irrational preppers, not about panic buying toilet paper, and certainly not at the expense of our freedoms or our economy. The preparation I want is logical and calm, and based on facts and knowledge—while we have time to do it. Australia faces threats, there are no two ways about it. We must be prepared to face any danger posed to Australia, and we must prepare early. We have to ensure our nation is ready for increased aggression from China and a number of other authoritarian states. If we wait until the wolf is at our door it will be too late.
NATIONAL SECURITY – THE SOLUTION
No Fuel, No Medicine, No Fertiliser, No Defence: Self-Reliance and You
In my last Newsletter, I wrote about Self Reliance and I said that I would try to explain what the term, so often used now as a result of COVID, means for you, your family, your household, your neighbourhood, your city and your nation. This is a big challenge which is easier addressed by asking even more questions than be providing discrete answers.
J, Molan, 'Has war with China already begun?', The Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2020
J, Molan, 'Has war with China already begun?', The Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2020
Australia’s Lack of Self-Reliance
This article explains the magnitude of the problem we face to achieve self-reliance here in Australia. We must recognise that our world—particularly in the region where we live and trade—is becoming less predictable and the chances of conflict are increasing. Our trade and supply lines and computer-based communications can be broken—COVID and several large hacks have shown that clearly. We must respond: relying on the market to deliver will not cut it any more.
Australia’s Lack of Self-Reliance
Musings on Sovereignty
COVID is far more than just a health and economic challenge. It is likely to change our lives in any number of ways that only time will tell. A small thing is the power of being able to communicate through Zoom, Skype or webinars which I hope is here to stay. In a busy life, no less busy due to COVID, there is nothing better than being forced to think issues through because you have to speak on them, and then being immediately questioned on issues that interest listeners. In many ways this is far better than the regimented formal media of some channels and the ideology of others – it is free and personal. Let’s hope Zoom or Skype or webinars are here to stay.
J.Molan, 'Musings on Sovereignty', 14 August 2020
J, Molan, 'We should be careful in pushing Beijing to the brink', The Australian 3 August 2020
J, Molan, 'We should be careful in pushing Beijing to the brink', The Australian 3 August 2020
J, Molan, ‘Op-Ed: Addressing concerns about the future submarines from a general's perspective’, Defence Connect, 21 July 2020.
In this Op-Ed I have summarised my position on the Attack Class Submarines project and how they fit into a National Defence Strategy. “Because of the war we may have to fight in the future and how we have decided to fight it, Australia needs submarines just as we need a range of surface ships and aircraft. We also need big submarines”
J Molan, ‘Give it everything we can': the case for putting winning first and expense second in national security’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 2020
This article published in The Sydney Morning Herald discusses my views on Australia's previous Defence strategies. "The problem with strategy in Australia is that for the last 75 years, Australia has not had to produce a national strategy nor a defence strategy that was ever tested. Our strategies have been just words, and for decade’s officials, commentators and bureaucrats have believed that just saying you have a strategy is the same as actually having a strategy."
J Molan, ‘We’re going to need a defence force with real bite’, The Australian, 1 July 2020
In this article I highlight to our nations unpreparedness and how our nation needs to build self-reliance as well as developing a National security strategy. "I have been saying for years that we should welcome the rise of China, but only from a position of strength. The national security strength that we should have encompasses economic, financial, diplomatic, governance, social and military factors. If we were appropriately strong in all these areas of national power, we could call ourselves self-reliant."
'We’re going to need a defence force with real bite'
J Molan, ‘Op-Ed: The intersection of a Grand Strategy and a National Security Strategy’, Defence Connect, 25 June 2020.
In this Op-Ed I have commented on Peter Layton’s article titled ‘Designing an Australian grand strategy for China’ "It is a blessed relief that Peter Layton is writing about Grand Strategy and China in ASPI’s The Strategist because so few people do so." In my response I explain that what Peter calls ‘grand strategy’ is what I have been writing about as being central to a National Security Strategy, an overarching mechanism for conveying to those responsible for every aspect of a nation (the economy, finance, diplomacy, governance, society and the military among others), what a government’s guidance is on policy integration to achieve or maintain national sovereignty as a free and prosperous liberal democracy.
‘Op-Ed: The intersection of a Grand Strategy and a National Security Strategy’
J,Molan, 'Defence Supplement', 20 May 2020
Optimism is at the centre of the Australian character. We tend to downplay things that might go wrong, insisting that “she’ll be right” and that we will find a way through whatever happens.
J.Molan, 'Defence Supplement', 20 May 2020
J Molan, ‘Op-Ed: The importance of a national sovereignty strategy’, Defence Connect, 29 April 2020
In this article I argue that in order for Australia to maintain its sovereignty in an even more demanding world, it must embrace widespread reform as it comes out of the COVID-19 crisis. Medium to longer-term reforms must be shaped by an overall sovereignty strategy.
‘Op-Ed: The importance of a national sovereignty strategy’
J Molan, ‘Getting the balance right in Australia’s coronavirus response’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 7 April 2020
I have provided a critique of Mark Beeson’s article ‘The revenge of Gaia?’ commenting that: "Beeson suggested that COVID-19 is, like climate change, ‘a product of changes in the natural environment’ and ‘partly a consequence of human activity and our collective impact on the biosphere’…Of course, the pandemic we’re facing is partly a consequence of human activity, but it would be more appropriate to identify the role played by unregulated ‘wet markets’ where anything and everything is up for consumption."
‘Getting the balance right in Australia’s coronavirus response’
J Molan, ‘Whatever the security question, the answer is a National Security Strategy’, The Centre of Gravity Series, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre: Australian National University, August 2019
Here I have argued that the nature of the world order has changed dramatically in recent times and in particular, that Australian can no longer rely on the US for its national security. I argued that a NSS is necessary in order to address these issues. I also stress that national security is broader than just defence and includes energy, resources and infrastructure. I also called for reforms to parliamentary oversight of defence including a bipartisan defence agreement and a new parliamentary defence committee.
‘Whatever the security question, the answer is a National Security Strategy’
J Molan, ‘Whatever the security question, the answer is a National Security Strategy’, The ANU, August 2019
In this Centre of Gravity Series, I examined why the current uncertain strategic environment should be of utmost importance to Australia. I also argued that priority of government should be the development of an effective, open and honest National Security Strategy, covering the nation as a whole as well as a new parliamentary committee for effective oversight of the proposed national security strategy function
‘Whatever the security question, the answer is a National Security Strategy’
J Molan, ‘Running near empty’, The Daily Telegraph, 24 June 2019
I cited liquid fuel import and export figures to back his argument that Australia lacks fuel resilience and requires a NSS. I noted: "Despite the good work conducted by the Coalition government in Defence over the last six years, our lack of resilience in liquid fuels is a symptom of a larger national security problem that extends to food, water, energy, transportation, defence, extreme emergency management and our alliances."
J Molan, ‘National security strategy key to linking new ADF capabilities together’, Defence Connect website, 29 April 2019
In this article I have highlighted changes in Australia’s national security since 2003 (the release of the last NSS). I also argued a national sovereignty strategy would improve Australia’s ability to defend itself against potential military, economic and social threats.
‘National security strategy key to linking new ADF capabilities together’
J Molan, ‘Australia’s defence and security: are we doing enough?’, The Strategist blog, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1 February 2019
In this article I praised the recent rise in defence expenditure, discussed the need for Australia’s maritime security and argued the biggest regional threat Australia faces is the rise of China. "The Coalition government’s spending on defence is wise, but a root-and-branch analysis resulting in an Australian national security strategy is the only way that Australia can assess whether our spend is enough, whether what we are buying is appropriate, and if we can afford to wait decades to rearm our military to deter conflict."
‘Australia’s defence and security: are we doing enough?’
J Molan and M Wesley, ‘Correspondence: "Dangerous proximity" by Michael Wesley’, Australian Foreign Affairs, February 2019
Here I have provided a critique of Michael Wesley’s article, Dangerous proximity: the collapse of Australia's defences in a contested Asia including the following: "Michael's article is a reminder that for decades Australia has lacked a national security strategy beyond hoping that a "great and powerful friend" will come to the rescue in the event of conflict. In retrospect, this approach worked. But I agree that it is no longer viable when the Indo-Pacific is emerging as one of the most important theatres of great power competition."
‘Correspondence: "Dangerous proximity" by Michael Wesley’
J Molan, ‘Parliamentary defence committee needs the power to pursue a national security strategy’, The Strategist blog, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 13 December 2018
In this article I called for better parliamentary oversight of defence by the creation of a joint parliamentary committee on defence. I argued that current oversight, including examples from my role in the sub-committee of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, is hampered by a lack of transparency and lack of access to classified information. I stated: "Why is it that intelligence and security are considered more worthy of effective parliamentary oversight than is defence? Those days have passed. Strategy should be its focus because nothing is more important than strategy. In the absence of a national security strategy, the sub-committee at its last meeting has resolved that, regardless of who is in government, its task during 2019 will be to hold an inquiry into the need for a national security strategy. The sub-committee can do this sub-optimally by using unclassified sources such as think tanks and academia. But imagine how much more effective parliament could be if it could also receive classified information from officials."
‘Parliamentary defence committee needs the power to pursue a national security strategy’
J Molan, ‘Getting real about Australia’s security’, The Strategist blog, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 19 November 2018
In the context of a discussion about the lessons of the Second World War for contemporary national security, I stated: "Australia now needs to match its rearmament program with a brutally realistic national security strategy, not one based on hope and delusion as we did in December 1941."
‘Getting real about Australia’s security’
J Molan, ‘Australia needs a clear national security strategy’, The Strategist blog, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12 October 2018
In response to an ASPI article by Bob Moyse, Winning battles and losing wars: the next force structure review "At present, the fundamental problems are that Australia doesn’t have a comprehensive national security strategy despite a relatively good level of defence spending, and there’s only limited consensus on the main security challenges we will face in the years to come."
‘Australia needs a clear national security strategy’
J Molan, ‘A stronger Australia can be a more useful U.S. ally’, The Australian, 4 January 2018
In this article I argued that US military capability is not as large as it once was and Australia cannot rely on the US alliance in the way that it has. Australia should be able to defeat any threat against it, but at the moment it would take a ridiculously long time to realise its amazing defence potential. And time is likely to be the one thing we do not have. I agree with Michael that our "approaches to defence planning are inadequate", but there should be a rule in commentary such as ours: no comment is to be made about tactical issues, in which we are all brilliant, until we actually have a national security strategy.
‘A stronger Australia can be a more useful U.S. ally’
J Molan, ’Defeating IS: We need a good strategy, not just more troops’ , ABC News, 18 December 2015
In this Article I have written about Australia’s involvement in defeating IS. As I have explained, “Australia should demand from the US a coherent set of tactics for defeating Islamic State before deciding whether to make a greater contribution to the war effort or commit boots on the ground.”
J Molan, ‘Reader response: Reserves, force structure and need’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 17 January 2013
In this piece I provided a critique of Nic Stuart’s article Reader response: Reserves, force structure and budget cuts. I have commented that "like so many people with very little firsthand experience of creating and using defence capability at any sophisticated level, Nic Stuart has effortlessly come up with yet another answer to the financial problems of Defence—Reserve manpower."
J Molan, There’s a price to pay to be a US ally, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 August 2013
In this article I have commented on our defence relationship with the United States. "The US is very important to us. In the short- to medium-term, the US alliance remains critical to Australia, but while we refuse to provide adequately for our own defence, as an ally we’re really a supplicant."
J Molan, ‘Why Our Defence Forces Face Terminal Decline’, Quadrant Online, 1 March 2013
In this article I have discussed the previous defence policies developed by the Rudd and Gillard Labor governments from 2007 to 2012. I have commented that “The process is broken, the strategic thinking is confused, the denial of the world and regional situation is dangerous, the management of our allies and others has been confusing, the leadership team is dislocated, the delivery of anything except the most simple capability or those purchased directly from the USA is bumbling, the constant policy disruption is grossly wasteful, and the explanations to the Australian people about ADF capability and risk are duplicitous. The result is a defence force in terminal decline and a people blissfully unaware. Australia is operating in a strategy-free environment. Even more than tanks and ships and planes, Australia needs a strategy and a government that can deliver it"
J Molan, ‘Why Our Defence Forces Face Terminal Decline’, Quadrant Online, 1 March 2013
J Molan, ‘Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 2’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 5 February 2013
Over the course of several blog posts and tweets, Andrew Davies and I decided to get together in person to hash out the issue of Need and strategic planning face to face. What ensued was a spirited discussion, the end of which, to my surprise, we found ourselves in violent agreement.
J Molan, ‘Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 1’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 5 February 2013
Over the course of several blog posts and tweets, Andrew Davies and I decided to get together in person to hash out the issue of Need and strategic planning face to face. What ensued was a spirited discussion, the end of which, to my surprise, we found ourselves in violent agreement.
J Molan, ‘Andrew Davies and Jim Molan talk strategy: round 1’ ASPI 5 Feb 2013
J Molan, ‘What is the strategic environment telling us about what the ADF needs to be able to do?’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 January 2013
In this article I have responded to one of Andrew Davies comments on my ‘Reader response: Reserves, force structure and need’ article. In this article I make it clear that "apart from the discussion on the efficacy of Reserves, I made one simple point and I stand by that point. There is no point in coming up with single solutions such as a greater use of the Reserves, a sub or JSF or amphib-heavy force until there has been an assessment of the strategic environment. Rule No 1 for Force Structuring: It does not matter what you put in your force structure if you don’t know why you are force structuring."
What is the strategic environment telling us about what the ADF needs to be able to do?
J Molan, ‘Reader response: Defence is different’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 September 2012
In this article I replied to Alex Tewe’s piece Neither democracy nor defence planning, which was originally commenting on my article On democracy and defence planning. In this article I addressed the specific comments Alex has made. I commented that "Alex Tewes has created a ‘straw man’ version of my argument in his rejoinder rather than dealing with my serious suggestions."
J Molan, ‘On democracy and defence planning’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 6 September 2012
In this article I propose to make Defence leadership’s views public, as well as Government’s final decisions. This proposal is intended to give the people a chance to hold the government to account.
J Molan, ‘Less is not always better: in defence of Force 2030’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 16 August 2012
In this piece I have commented on Mark Thomson’s article How much is too little? Learning to live with a smaller force. Here I have argued that "while Mark Thomson believes the reduction in defence funding is retrievable, I believe that we must assess What the ADF needs to be, based on the world as it is and not the world as you want it to be, honestly assessing the current capability of the ADF not as you imagine it might be, but from actual operational output. And then we can start to fit it into whatever the government is prepared to pay. Strangely, the last time this was thoroughly done, the force structure that came out was called Force 2030."